Weekly Cyber Signal: The Way In Belonged to Someone Else

Three stories this week, three ways in. None of them came through the company's own front door. One came through a vendor's key, one through a script that companies load on their own websites, and one sits in the Java underneath tools that security teams trust.
Here's what mattered, and what it tells us.
1. Expedia: the way in was a vendor's key
What happened
On November 12, Expedia confirmed to Skift that attackers reached its systems through a compromised third-party data platform provider. In a statement shared with Forbes, Expedia said it is "aware of a supply chain attack" and that its "platforms are safe to use for both travelers and partners."
An extortion group calling itself n0n claims to have taken more than 830 million loyalty records and hundreds of millions of account records, per Forbes and Security Affairs. Expedia has not verified those numbers, and its investigation is ongoing. A ransom negotiator quoted by Forbes, who is not involved in the case, said the claim "looks like a pressure tactic."
Forbes and Security Affairs, citing Wiz and Sentra, report that the attack used a stolen vendor key from Qubole, a Google Cloud Platform partner. Skift notes that Expedia has not confirmed a link to Qubole, which it describes as a former Expedia vendor, and that Sentra found former Qubole customers never revoked its access permissions.
What it tells us
The vendor you stopped using may still hold a key. And anyone holding a valid key looks like a normal user. Locks and firewalls see a trusted login. What gives it away is what happens next.
2. Optimizely: the way in was a trusted script
What happened
According to Optimizely, an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation platform and added malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. Report URI researcher Scott Helme found malicious code in scripts linked to 178 organizations on November 16. Optimizely says it has fixed the flaw and removed the code.
What it tells us
A company's own servers didn't have to be breached. A script it trusted was enough.
3. Java: the open door under the tools
What happened
On November 17, CISA urged organizations to immediately patch a critical Oracle Java flaw, CVE-2026-114938, according to Cyber Daily. Per Qualys, researchers showed takeover without a login in default setups of Jira, Confluence, Jenkins, Keycloak, Artifactory and PingFederate. Qualys says there is no public confirmation of exploitation yet.
What it tells us
This one is an open door, not a breach. The apps didn't have the bug. The Java they share did.
The pattern

Three stories, one shape. The weak point wasn't the company. It was something the company trusted: a vendor's access, a vendor's script, a runtime under the tools.
The safe buy used to be the brand. Now it's the layer behind it.
The honest limit
You can't inspect every vendor's security, and you won't patch every layer the day a fix ships. When the way in is a trusted key or a trusted system, the first steps inside look normal. The question is how fast you notice what comes after.
Three checks that may be worth a look Monday
It may be worth listing every vendor that holds a key to your data, including vendors you no longer use, and considering revoking what nobody can justify.
Consider listing the third-party scripts on your public sites, and who can change each one.
Consider finding every Java 17.0.6 and later on newer Intel or AMD servers, including the Java bundled inside vendor products, and patching or applying Qualys's stopgap.
One question for your team
"Which vendor that we stopped paying could still log in tomorrow?"
Get the weekly brief
The attacks that mattered and what they tell us, in your inbox every week. Free.



Comments